This vulnerability allows the malicious manipulation of repositories containing submodules, exploiting a bug that enables the writing of files into the .git/ directory instead of the submodule's intended worktree. This manipulation facilitates the execution of arbitrary code during the cloning process, bypassing user inspection and control.

This vulnerability can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker who places a specialized repository on the target's local system. If the victim clones this repository, the attacker can execute arbitrary code.

This flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to place a specialized repository on their target's local system. For performance reasons, Git uses hardlinks when cloning a repository located on the same disk. However, if the repo being cloned is owned by a different user, this can introduce a security risk. At any time in the future, the original repo owner could rewrite the hardlinked files in the cloned user's repo.

This flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to place a repository on their target's local system that contains symlinks. During the cloning process, Git could be tricked into creating hardlinked arbitrary files into their repository's objects/ directory, impacting availability and integrity.

A flaw was found in Git in a full copy of a Git repository. A prerequisite for this vulnerability is for an unauthenticated attacker to place a specialized repository on their target's local system. If the victim were to clone this repository, it could result in arbitrary code execution.