A flaw was found in the urllib3 package. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to information exposure through sent data when the authorization HTTP header is not removed during a cross-origin redirect. An attacker can expose credentials in the authorization header to unintended hosts or transmit them in clear text by exploiting the incomplete fix for CVE-2018-20060.

In Go before 1.15.13 and 1.16.x before 1.16.5, there can be a panic for a large exponent to the math/big.Rat SetString or UnmarshalText method.

The crypto/tls package of Go through 1.16.5 does not properly assert that the type of public key in an X.509 certificate matches the expected type when doing a RSA based key exchange, allowing a malicious TLS server to cause a TLS client to panic.

Reader.Read does not set a limit on the maximum size of file headers. A maliciously crafted archive could cause Read to allocate unbounded amounts of memory, potentially causing resource exhaustion or panics. After fix, Reader.Read limits the maximum size of header blocks to 1 MiB.

Requests forwarded by ReverseProxy include the raw query parameters from the inbound request, including unparsable parameters rejected by net/http. This could permit query parameter smuggling when a Go proxy forwards a parameter with an unparsable value. After fix, ReverseProxy sanitizes the query parameters in the forwarded query when the outbound request's Form field is set after the ReverseProxy. Director function returns, indicating that the proxy has parsed the query parameters. Proxies which do not parse query parameters continue to forward the original query parameters unchanged.

Programs which compile regular expressions from untrusted sources may be vulnerable to memory exhaustion or denial of service. The parsed regexp representation is linear in the size of the input, but in some cases the constant factor can be as high as 40,000, making relatively small regexps consume much larger amounts of memory. After fix, each regexp being parsed is limited to a 256 MB memory footprint. Regular expressions whose representation would use more space than that are rejected. Normal use of regular expressions is unaffected.

Extremely large RSA keys in certificate chains can cause a client/server to expend significant CPU time verifying signatures. With fix, the size of RSA keys transmitted during handshakes is restricted to <= 8192 bits. Based on a survey of publicly trusted RSA keys, there are currently only three certificates in circulation with keys larger than this, and all three appear to be test certificates that are not actively deployed. It is possible there are larger keys in use in private PKIs, but we target the web PKI, so causing breakage here in the interests of increasing the default safety of users of crypto/tls seems reasonable.

The html/template package does not properly handle HTML-like "" comment tokens, nor hashbang "#!" comment tokens, in <script> contexts. This may cause the template parser to improperly interpret the contents of <script> contexts, causing actions to be improperly escaped. This may be leveraged to perform an XSS attack.

The html/template package does not apply the proper rules for handling occurrences of "<script", "<!--", and "</script" within JS literals in <script> contexts. This may cause the template parser to improperly consider script contexts to be terminated early, causing actions to be improperly escaped. This could be leveraged to perform an XSS attack.

Processing an incomplete post-handshake message for a QUIC connection can cause a panic.

QUIC connections do not set an upper bound on the amount of data buffered when reading post-handshake messages, allowing a malicious QUIC connection to cause unbounded memory growth. With fix, connections now consistently reject messages larger than 65KiB in size.

A malicious HTTP sender can use chunk extensions to cause a receiver reading from a request or response body to read many more bytes from the network than are in the body. A malicious HTTP client can further exploit this to cause a server to automatically read a large amount of data (up to about 1GiB) when a handler fails to read the entire body of a request. Chunk extensions are a little-used HTTP feature which permit including additional metadata in a request or response body sent using the chunked encoding. The net/http chunked encoding reader discards this metadata. A sender can exploit this by inserting a large metadata segment with each byte transferred. The chunk reader now produces an error if the ratio of real body to encoded bytes grows too small.

Before Go 1.20, the RSA based TLS key exchanges used the math/big library, which is not constant time. RSA blinding was applied to prevent timing attacks, but analysis shows this may not have been fully effective. In particular it appears as if the removal of PKCS#1 padding may leak timing information, which in turn could be used to recover session key bits. In Go 1.20, the crypto/tls library switched to a fully constant time RSA implementation, which we do not believe exhibits any timing side channels.

A flaw was found in urllib3, an HTTP client library for Python. urllib3 doesn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 301, 302, or 303, after changing the method in a request from one that could accept a request body such as POST to GET, as is required by HTTP RFCs. This issue requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality, therefore, the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies; if this is the case, this vulnerability isn't exploitable.

A flaw was found in the SSH channel integrity. By manipulating sequence numbers during the handshake, an attacker can remove the initial messages on the secure channel without causing a MAC failure. For example, an attacker could disable the ping extension and thus disable the new countermeasure in OpenSSH 9.5 against keystroke timing attacks.

BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and repeatable manner. A malicious BuildKit client or frontend could craft a request that could lead to BuildKit daemon crashing with a panic. The issue has been fixed in v0.12.5. As a workaround, avoid using BuildKit frontends from untrusted sources.